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INTRODUCTION 
Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan. Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan. The 
very names of the nations comprising the Amu Darya Basin
1
 
conjure images of dusty merchants traveling the Old Silk Road 
to exchange European precious metals and horses for Chinese 
silk and porcelain.
2
 Today, regional powers with voracious 
appetites for energy—Russia to the north, India to the south, 
China to the east, and Iran as well as Europe to the west—
compete for access
3
 to the recently-discovered Central Asian 
                                                 
1 JAKOB GRANIT ET AL., REGIONAL WATER INTELLIGENCE REPORT 
CENTRAL ASIA: BASELINE REPORT, 15 (2010) [hereinafter GRANIT], 
http://www.watergovernance.org/documents/WGF/Reports/Paper-
15_RWIR_Aral_Sea.pdf. Iran and Afghanistan are the other two countries in 
the Amu Darya Basin, but are not former Soviet states. Id. 
2 From Exotic to Everyday: The New Silk Road Shrinks a Continent, 
CENT. EUR. UNIV. (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.ceu.hu/node/34428. 
3 See generally, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE NEW GREAT 
GAME IN CENTRAL ASIA: CHINA ANALYSIS (2011), available at 
http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/China%20Analysis_The%20new%20Great%20Game%20in%20Central%20A
sia_September2011.pdf (describing scramble among regional powers for 
Central Asian fossil fuels). 
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fossil fuel bonanza.
4
 Russia, Pakistan and India vie with each 
other to connect to Central Asian gas, petroleum, and mineral 
fields on a North-South axis, while Europe and China struggle to 
do the same on an East-West plane.
5
 These rival powers fund 
competing infrastructure and economic development projects 
such as natural gas pipelines, dams, regional power sources, and 
roads.
6
 The success of these projects depends on stability among 
the Soviet Successor States.
7
 Stability among the Successor 
States requires resolving the conflicts caused by the water 
management scheme
8
 of the Amu Darya Basin, which is based 
                                                 
4 H.E. Sham L. Bathija, Senior Economic Adviser to President Hamid 
Karzai of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Statement at the SAIS Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute and CSIS Forum at Johns Hopkins University: The 
New Silk Road Initiative: Towards a New Strategy for Regional Economic 
Cooperation (Sept. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Bathija], available at 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/110929SEAP_Bathija.pd
f. Afghanistan has estimated mineral reserves of 2-3 trillion dollars. Id. 
Turkmenistan is estimated to have the fourth largest natural gas reserves in the 
world. No international pipeline firm ready to implement TAPI gas project, 
THE ECON. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2012, 4:53 PM), http://articles.economictimes.india 
times.com/2012-10-16/news/34498967_1_tapi-gas-turkmenistan-afghanistan-
pakistan-india-gas-pipeline. 
5 Bathija, supra note 4. 
6 See Robert D. Hormats, Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and 
Agricultural Affairs, Address at the SAIS Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and 
CSIS Forum at Johns Hopkins University: The United States’ “New Silk Road” 
Strategy: What is it? Where is it Headed? (Sept. 29, 2011) [hereinafter 
Hormats], available at http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2011/ 174800.htm. One 
proposed project is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India [TAPI] 
Natural Gas Pipeline. Id. Turkmenistan lans to export 24 billion m3 of natural 
gas to China in 2012. Vladimir Socor, Beijing Proposes Turkmenistan-China 
Gas Pipeline Through Northern Afghanistan, THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION 
(June 19, 2012), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews 
[tt_news]=39510#.UjoONT_4Kio. Turkmenistan has promised to supply gas to 
Europe as part of the Nabucco pipeline project. Turkmenistan Pledges Gas for 
EU’s Nabucco Pipeline, BBC (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-europe-11797792. 
7 See Hormats, supra note 6. 
8 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, GLOBAL WATER SECURITY: 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT V (2012), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Special%20Report_ICA%20Global%20W
ater%20Security.pdf. 
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on outdated Soviet-era policies.
9
   
The Soviet management plan for the Amu Darya Basin 
known as the “water-energy nexus” has resulted in several 
sources of conflict among the Successor States: (1) tensions 
caused by an inadequate water management scheme, (2) tensions 
caused by using water for irrigated agriculture, and (3) tensions 
caused by using water for hydroelectricity.
 10
    
To preserve Central Asia's geopolitical stability, the 
stakeholders in the Amu Darya Basin should become parties to 
the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses [“UNWC”]11 for seven 
reasons:
 
(1) helping the Amu Darya stakeholders draft a regional 
convention targeted at the Amu Darya, (2) improving the water 
management structure, (3) encouraging engagement with 
Afghanistan, (4) managing the Amu Darya according to already 
endorsed sustainable, integrated resource development and 
management principles, (5) preserving the rights and obligations 
of Amu Darya states under the current water management 
regime, (6) improving information sharing and monitoring,  and   
(7) providing a useful set of dispute resolution procedures. Part I 
of this paper describes the Amu Darya Basin’s hydrology and 
history. Part II introduces the “water-energy nexus.” Part III 
describes international watercourse law. Part IV introduces the 
UNWC. Part V explains why the Amu Darya riparians should 
                                                 
9 United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], Sustainable 
Management of Water Resources Key to Peace and Security in Central Asia, 
UNEP (July 11, 2011), http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/ 
Default.asp?DocumentID=2647&ArticleID=8807&l=en&t=long. 
10 United Nations Environment Programme, Environment and Security 
Initiative, Environment and Security in the Amu Darya Basin, 34 (2011) 
[hereinafter ENVSEC] http://www.zoinet.org/web/sites/default/files/ 
publications/AmuDarya-EN-Web.pdf; see Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi & Brittany 
Brannon, Conflict and Cooperation: The Aral Sea Basin, in WATER RESOURCE 
Conflicts and INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 165 (Dhirendra K. Vajpeyi ed., 2012) 
[hereinafter Vajpeyi]. 
11 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, opened for signature May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 
700, UN Doc. No. A/51/869; GAOR, 51st Sess., [hereinafter UNWC], available 
at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/51/ 
229&Lang=E. 
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become parties to the UNWC and considers reasons the former 
Soviet States might hesitate to become parties.  
 
I.  AMU DARYA BASIN 
An ancient Turkmen proverb proclaims: “Suw damjasy 
altyn danesi” or “A drop of water is a grain of gold.” 12 In the 
arid Amu Darya Basin, fresh water is scarce.
13
 Basin population 
growth from 14 million in 1960 to approximately 50 million in 
2010 has exacerbated water scarcity.
14
  
Known as the Oxus in Ancient Greece, the Amu Darya 
flows approximately 2,540 km and is the longest river in Central 
Asia.
15
  The Amu Darya River flows west as it descends from the 
mountains of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, forming its main stem 
at the border of Tajikistan and Afghanistan.
16
 The Amu Darya 
then flows northwest, serving as the border between the deserts 
of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan until it flows into Uzbekistan, 
where it eventually discharges into the Aral Sea.
17
 
                                                 
12
 Drop of Water is a Gold Grain 2010 - International Exhibition and 
Conference of Water Resources of Turkmenistan, TURKMENEXPO.RU, 
http://turkmenexpo.com/db/exhibition/view/6021/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2012). 
13 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Irrigation in the 
Countries of the Former Soviet Union in Figures (1997), http://www.fao.org/ 
docrep/W6240E/w6240e03.htm.  
14 ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 23. The population in the Amu Darya 
Basin is as follows: Afghanistan 7.84 million, Kyrgyzstan 60 thousand, 
Tajikistan 5 million, Turkmenistan 2.14 million and Uzbekistan 5.07 million. 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE], Second 
Assessment of Transboundary Rivers, Lakes and Groundwaters, 109 (2011), 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/publications/assessment/Engli
sh/G_PartIV_Chapter3_En.pdf. 
15 ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 14. The army of Alexander the Great made 
its most celebrated crossing of the Oxus probably in Southeast Turkmenistan 
using rafts over a five-day period. Jona Lendering, Bessus/Ataxerxes V, 
LIVIUS.ORG , http://www.livius.org/be-bm/bessus/bessus.html (last visited Dec. 
22, 2012). 
16 ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 14.  Glaciers in the mountains of 
Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan generate 90 percent of the Basin’s 
water resources. Id.; Vakhsh River: Rivers and Lakes of Tajikistan, ORIENTAL 
EXPRESS CENTRAL ASIA, http://www.tajikistan.orexca.com/vakhsh_river.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
17 ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 14.   
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II.  CONFLICT IN THE AMU DARYA BASIN: THE “WATER-
ENERGY NEXUS” 
The “water-energy nexus” refers to the water/electricity and 
natural gas allocation scheme established during the Soviet 
Union and preserved by the 1992 Almaty Agreement.
 18
 It 
originated as a Soviet political strategy “used by Moscow 
planners to ‘divide and rule’ Central Asia”19 by forcing reliance 
upon the central planners in Moscow.
20
 Under the plan, “[t]he 
upstream states of Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) 
released water during the spring and summer” free of charge to 
irrigate crops in the downstream countries and stored water 
during the frigid winters.
21
 The downstream states reciprocated 
by providing free electricity and gas from fossil fuel sources to 
the upstream countries “to cover domestic energy demand” in 
winter.
22
  
Today, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan continue to provide free 
water to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but Uzbekistan charges 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan for Uzbek and Turkmen electricity 
and gas.
23
 Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan continue to meet domestic 
electricity needs almost exclusively through hydropower,
24
 while 
                                                 
18 Vajpeyi, supra note 10, at 165; Agreement on Cooperation in the Field 
of Joint Water Resources Management and Conservation of Interstate Sources, 
Kaz.-Kirgy.-Uzb.-Taj.-Turkm., Feb. 18, 1992 [hereinafter Almaty Agreement], 
available at http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/agreements/ 
ICWC-Feb18-1992.pdf. 
19 Vajpeyi, supra note 10, at 165. 
20 Id. 
21 ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 34.  
22 Id. 
23 Gulnura Toralieva, Power Struggle Threatens Central Asian Electricity 
Grid, INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING (Nov. 24, 2009), 
http://iwpr.net/report-news/power-struggle-threatens-central-asian-electricity-
grid; Central Asia facing new power crisis, BUSINESS NEWS EUROPE (Nov. 28, 
2012), http://www.bne.eu/story4308/Central_Asia_facing_new_power_crisis; 
see Sebastien Peyrouse, The Central Asian Power Grid in Danger? CENT. 
ASIA-CAUCASUS INST. ANALYST (Dec. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5232. 
24 GRANIT, supra note 1, at 20. Tajikistan generates 98 percent of its 
electricity from hydroelectric sources. Id. 
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Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan produce nearly all their electricity 
from fossil fuels.
25
 The current water allocation scheme limits 
the upstream countries to only 19 percent of the Amu Darya’s 
water resources, with the rest designated primarily for crop 
irrigation in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,
26
 precluding 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan from further developing their 
domestic hydropower resources to meet domestic energy 
demand, despite having the ability to do so.
27
 The “water-energy 
nexus” has resulted in three main sources of conflict among the 
Amu Darya States: (1) inadequate management and legal 
oversight, (2) inefficient methods of irrigated agriculture, and (3) 
the development of hydroelectric dams.  
 
A.  Inadequate Water Management Scheme  
The management and legal structures governing water 
allocation in the Amu Darya Basin originated during the Soviet 
period, reflect outdated priorities, and are inadequate for the 
Amu Darya States to meet their international obligations.
28
 
Currently three intergovernmental organizations are responsible 
for water resources management in the Amu Darya Basin: the 
Executive Committee of the International Fund for Saving the 
Aral Sea (EC-IFAS), the Interstate Commission for Water 
Coordination (ICWC), and the Interstate Commission for 
                                                 
25 Id. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan meet 90 percent of their electric 
needs from fossil fuel sources. Id. 
26 ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 36. The annual water withdrawal limits are 
as follows: Kyrgyzstan 0.45km3, Tajikistan 9.5 km3, Uzbekistan 28.05km3, and 
Turkmenistan 22.15 km3.  Id. Afghanistan withdraws an estimated 2km3. Id. at 
44. 
27 See ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 14, 34; GRANIT supra note 1, at 15. On 
average, the total amount of surface water in the Basin is 78 km3. ENVSEC, 
supra note 14, at 14. Of this 55.73 km3 is in Tajikistan, 14.5 km3 is in 
Afghanistan, 5.06 km3 is in Uzbekistan, 1.60 km3 is in Kyrgyzstan, 1.53 km3 is 
in Turkmenistan, and 0.86 km3 is in Iran. GRANIT, supra note 1, at 15. 
28 See Strengthening the Institutional and Legal Frameworks of the 
International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea: Review and Proposals, EC-IFAS, 
3-5 (Jan. 31, 2010) (discussion paper) [hereinafter Strengthening IFAS], 
available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/cadialogue/ 
docs/Draft_Paper_united_FINAL_ENG.pdf. 
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Sustainable Development (ICSD).
29
 Of the Amu Darya States 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are 
members of these three organizations.
30
 The EC-IFAS governs 
the ICWC and ICSD.
31
 The EC-IFAS develops and implements 
water management policy such as the Aral Sea Basin Programs 
(ASBPs), which are the long-term strategies governing water 
resource management in the entire Aral Sea Basin.
32
 The ICWC 
administers the allocation of water resources in the Aral Sea 
Basin and includes the Basin Water Organization (BWO) Amu 
Darya, which manages the hydrostructures in the Amu Darya 
Basin.
33
 The ICSD primarily helps the Amu Darya States meet 
their obligations under environmental conventions.
34
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Id. at 4. 
30 See ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 42; EC-IFAS, ARAL SEA BASIN 
PROGRAM 3 4 [hereinafter ASBP-3] (on file with author); Legal Basis of IFAS, 
EC IFAS, (2011), http://ec-ifas.waterunites-ca.org/about/mfsa/110-legal-basis-of-
ifas.html. 
31 Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 17.  
32
 ASBP-3, supra note 30, at 7. ASBP-1 began in 1994 and ASBP-2 
lasted from 2003-2010. Id. Currently, Aral Sea Basin Program-3 (ASBP-3) is 
the “main long-term action program” for water resource management in the 
Amu Darya Basin. Id. at 3. ASBP-3’s implementation period lasts from 2011-
2015. Id. at 4. The heads of state of the IFAS member countries adopted ASBP-
3 in 2012. ASBP-3 has been signed by all countries of IFAS, EC IFAS (May 17, 
2012), http://www.ec-ifas.org/; see generally Joint Statement of the Heads of 
States Founders of the International Fund for Savin[g] the Aral Sea (Apr. 28, 
2009) [hereinafter Joint Statement], available at http://www.waterunites-
ca.org/themes/42-joint-statement-of-the-heads-of-states-founders-of-the-
international-fund-for-savin-the-aral-sea.html?view=booktext (tasking EC-
IFAS with developing the ASBP-3 Program). 
33 Yu. Khudaiberganov, Particular Characteristics of Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM), in the Amudarya River Basin, 77 
IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MGMT. IN CENT. ASIA: NATO 
SCIENCE SERIES 37, 37-38 (2007). As of 2003, the BWO Amu Darya manages 
“90 hydrostructures, of which 35 are head intake structures, as well as 337 km 
of interstate canals.” Id. The BWO Amu Darya has four branches: one each in 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and two in Uzbekistan. Id. at 38. 
34 Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 18. 
2013] Weaponizing Water 417 
 
1.  Ineffective Water Management Hierarchy  
 
The current water resource management structure suffers 
from numerous shortcomings.
35
 While the IFAS theoretically 
governs the ICWC and ICSD, in practice, the three organizations 
operate independently.
36
 Because the BWO Amu Darya only 
manages water resources on the middle and lower reaches of the 
Amu Darya, the BWO Amu Darya  cannot ensure that the 
upstream countries with their dams, reservoirs, and enormous 
hydroelectric potential abide by the prescribed water-withdrawal 
limits.
37
 Furthermore, the ICWC lacks representation from the 
energy, environmental protection or meteorological sectors.
38
 
Excluding Afghanistan from the management structure could 
exacerbate regional tensions as Afghanistan wants to build 
hydroelectric dams.
39
 Recognizing the faults of the current 
structure, the Heads of State of the IFAS member nations 
expressed their desire to improve the organizational and legal 
structure of IFAS in a 2009 Joint Statement.
40
  
 
2.  Inadequate Current Legal Framework   
 
The Almaty Agreement serves as the main multilateral 
water agreement in the Aral Sea Basin.
41
 Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are all parties.
42
 The 
Agreement identifies cooperation in “joint water resources 
management” as a key purpose.43 It provides for the “equal rights 
                                                 
35 Id. at 4. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 17.  
39 See Walter Klemm & Sayed Sharif Shobair, The Afghan Part of Amu 
Darya Basin: Impact of Irrigation in Northern Afghanistan on Water Use in the 
Amu Darya Basin, FAO REPORT TO UNECE, 10 (2010),  
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/SPECA/documents/ecf/2010/FAO_repo
rt_e.pdf; Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 29. 
40 Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 20; Joint Statement, supra note 
32, art. 2. 
41 Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 6. 
42 Almaty Agreement, supra note 18.  
43 Id. 
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and responsibility” according to the standard of “rational and 
economic use of water resources.”44 It governs according to the 
standard of “common principles for the whole region” and 
“equitable regulation” and preserved the water allocation regime 
from the Soviet Era.
45
 The 1993 Kyzl-Orda Agreement
46
 and 
2006 Sustainable Development Convention
47
 echo the Almaty 
Agreement’s48 emphasis on “rational use” of water resources 
through conservation and responsible management, not harming 
other Amu Darya States’ ability to use the river’s resources, and 
desire to adhere to the principles of international water law.
49
 
While the Almaty Agreement helped the nascent Republics 
develop a coherent water resource management framework, it 
was drafted quickly and requires revision.
50
 For example, the 
Agreement fails to clearly define its scope and objectives, does 
not incorporate the “universally recognized legal principles and 
                                                 
44 Id. pmbl. para. 2, art. 10. 
45 Id. pmbl. para. 3; see Masood Ahmad  & Mahwash Wasiq, Water 
Resource Development in Northern Afghanistan and Its Implications for Amu 
Darya Basin, WORLD BANK WORKING PAPER NO. 36, 29-30 (2004), 
http://waterwiki.net/images/5/5d/WB-workin_papre_2004_Amu_Darya_ 
Water_Resources.pdf.  
46 Agreement Between Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Republic of Uzbekistan on Joint 
Activities in Addressing the Aral Sea and the Zone Around the Sea Crisis, 
Improving the Environment, and Enduring the Social and Economic 
Development of the Aral Sea Region, Mar. 26, 1993 [hereinafter Kyzl-Orda 
Agreement] (establishing IFAS), available at http://www.icwc-
aral.uz/statute13.htm; Framework Convention for the Protection of the 
Environment for Sustainable Development in Central Asia Between Republic 
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
The Republic of Uzbekistan, arts. 3-7, 10, 16-17, (Nov. 22, 2006) [hereinafter 
Sustainable Development Convention], available at http://www.ecolex.org/ 
server2.php/libcat/docs/TRE/Multilateral/En/TRE143806.pdf; see Treaties: 
Record Details, ECOLEX, http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/Record 
Details;document_Framework%20Convention%20on%20Environmental%20Pr
otection%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20in%20Central%20Asia.ht
ml?DIDPFDSI?id=TRE-143806&index=treaties (last visited Dec. 22, 2012). 
47 Kyzl-Orda Agreement, supra note 46, art. 1; Sustainable Development 
Convention, supra note 46, arts. 3-7, 10, 16-17. 
48 Almaty Agreement, supra note 18, art. 10. 
49 Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 9-10. 
50 Id. at 8. 
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conceptual frameworks of water management such as reasonable 
and equitable use of transboundary waters . . . the ecosystem 
approach, [and] the basin principle of management.”51 It fails to 
establish protocols for “notification and consultations on planned 
activities, which may have a transboundary impact.”52 Further, 
the dispute resolution mechanisms of the Almaty Agreement do 
not define procedures.
53
 Finally, the Almaty Agreement does not 
consider issues modern treaties consider essential such as the 
monitoring and protection of biological resources.
54
  
The Heads of the Central Asian States have promulgated 
joint declarations that, while non-binding, help to establish water 
policy in the region.
55
 These declarations include Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as parties and emphasize 
four main points with which the UNWC can assist: (1) 
strengthening regional water management institutions, especially 
the IFAS; (2) drafting a regional convention on transboundary 
watercourses; (3) increasing coordination between Amu Darya 
States and the international community; and (4) adhering to 
sustainable development principles.
56
 
The Nukus Declaration confirmed the desire of Amu Darya 
states to strengthen the regional water management bodies such 
as the IFAS.
57
 In the 2002 Dushanbe Declaration, the heads of 
state affirmed their support for “implementing the Action Plan 
on the Aral Sea” and agreed to request a UN commission to 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 7. 
56 See generally infra notes 57-61 (illustrating how the joint declarations 
of the Central Asian States support the same water resource management 
principles as the UNWC). 
57 NUKUS DECLARATION OF THE STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON PROBLEMS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
OF ARAL SEA BASIN, art. 4 (1995), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR 
SAVING THE ARAL SEA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 10 YEARS IFAS (DECISIONS AND 
EVENTS), 62-66 (2003) [hereinafter Nukus Declaration], available at 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1773_VL102306.pdf. 
420 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22:1 
 
assist the EC-IFAS in improving the systems of monitoring and 
information exchange for the “rational use” of water.58  
Central Asian leaders expressed their desire to create a 
regional convention for the “sustainable development of the Aral 
Sea basin,” in the 1995 Nukus Declaration, 59 the 2001 Tashkent 
Statement
60
 and the 2009 Joint Statement.
61
 Since 2009, the 
impetus for drafting a regional convention on watercourses has 
grown.
62
 The IFAS even expressed its willingness to alter the 
“legal framework of IFAS.”63  
The Nukus Declaration also emphasized the importance of 
coordinating with international partners.
64
 The 2004 
Memorandum of Understanding between the IFAS and United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE] also 
stressed international cooperation.
65
 2008 marked a watershed 
                                                 
58 DUSHANBE DECLARATION (2002), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL FUND 
FOR SAVING THE ARAL SEA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 10 YEARS IFAS (DECISIONS 
AND EVENTS), 165-67 (2003) [hereinafter Dushanbe Declaration], available at 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1773_VL102306.pdf. The Heads of State 
pledged to “improve monitoring and exchange of information systems between 
the countries on water and other natural resources situation with the purpose of 
making timely and correct decisions on their rational use.” Id. 
59 Nukus Declaration, supra note 57, art. 2. 
60 TASHKENT STATEMENT ART. 3 (2001), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL 
FUND FOR SAVING THE ARAL SEA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 10 YEARS IFAS 
(DECISIONS AND EVENTS), 135-39 (2003) [hereinafter Tashkent Statement], 
available at http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1773_VL102306.pdf. The 
Statement also expressed a willingness to “render humanitarian and other 
assistance” to help in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Id. art. 6. 
61 Joint Statement, supra note 32, arts. 2-3. 
62 International High Level Conference, Almaty, Kaz., Oct. 25-27, 2011, 
“Strengthening Transboundary Water Cooperation in Central Asia: The Role 
of International Water Law and the UNECE Water Convention” And the 
Workshop on the Protocol on Water and Health ¶ 18 [hereinafter Strengthening 
Transboundary Water Cooperation], available at 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/cadialogue/docs/Almaty_Oct
2011/Report_En_final.pdf. 
63 Joint Statement, supra note 32, arts. 2-3. 
64 Nukus Declaration, supra note 57, pmbl. 
65 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe/The United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific and The International Fund for Saving the 
Aral Sea, June 3, 2004, [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding] 
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moment as the IFAS was granted observer status in the UN 
General Assembly,
66
 and Germany launched the Berlin Process 
in April 2008.
67
 Germany and the Central Asian States have 
pledged support for the Berlin Process.
68
  
The Nukus Declaration declared the Central Asian States’ 
“[a]dherence to principles of sustainable development,”69 as well 
as their “complete support” of the U.N. “[d]eclarations on 
sustainable development” including the Rio Declaration, “the 
international conventions on struggle against desertification, 
about global change of . . . climate, about preservation of . . .  
biological variety and about protection of transborder waters.”70 
In the 1997 Almaty Declaration, the Central Asian States agreed 
to manage transboundary water resources using an ecosystem 
approach.
71
 The regional declarations highlight the cornerstones 
of the UNWC: cooperation, sustainable development, and 
increased engagement with the international community.
72
   
 
                                                                                                 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/oes/MOU/IFAS_MoU_Final_E_15Oct2
010.pdf. 
66 G.A. Res. 63/133, U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/133 
(Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Observer Status Resolution], available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/63/133&Lang=E. 
67 The Berlin Process, GIZ, (2011), http://www.waterca.org/berlin-
process?lang=en. The Berlin Process was launched “by the German Federal 
Government to the countries of Central Asia to support them in water 
management and to make water a subject of intensified transboundary 
cooperation.” Id. 
68 Joint Declaration of the Conference Blue Diplomacy for Central Asia 
held in Berlin on cooperation within the scope of the Central Asia Water 
Initiative between the Federal Republic of Germany on the one side and the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the other (Mar. 7-8, 2012), 
[hereinafter Berlin Declaration], http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/613050/publicationFile/166241/120308-
Gem_Erklaerung_Wasserkonferenz.pdf. The EC-IFAS works with German 
partners. Id., art. 6.. 
69 Nukus Declaration, supra note 57, art. 1. 
70 Id. art. 2. 
71 See Almaty Agreement, supra note 18. 
72 See generally UNWC, supra note 11, arts. 5-9, 20, 24-25, 33 
(describing key obligations under the UNWC). 
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B.  Irrigated Agriculture as Source of Conflict 
Soviet cotton production policies have resulted in four 
sources of tension in the Amu Darya Basin: (1) an inefficient 
irrigation network; (2) domestic water-use policies encouraging 
waste; (3) the disappearance of the Aral Sea; and (4) the 
development of Turkmenistan’s Altyn Asyr Lake.  
First, in the 1930’s, Soviet central planners recognized the 
economic value of cotton and constructed a “massive irrigation 
network” to produce the “water-dependent crop” in the deserts of 
Central Asia.
73
 Cotton production continues to dominate the 
Amu Darya Basin’s agricultural sector.74 Irrigated agriculture 
consumes approximately 53km
3
 of the Amu Darya's 78km
3
 
surface water resources with approximately 50 percent of that 
amount lost due to evaporation, unlined canals, or other factors.
75
 
Second, the pricing structure of the cotton industry incentivizes 
inefficient water-management.
76
 Typically, government cotton 
buyers pay a set amount for a certain quota of cotton, regardless 
of how efficiently the cotton was produced.
77
 Additionally, water 
is usually heavily subsidized by the government in Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan.
78
 Third, cotton production techniques diverted 
                                                 
73 Vajpeyi, supra note 10, at 162; GRANIT supra note 1 at 22-23. In the 
Aral Sea Basin, there are approximately 500,000 km of canals. GRANIT supra 
note 1, at 16. 
74 GRANIT supra note 1 at 7. In the Amu Darya Basin, much land is used 
for irrigated agriculture: in Afghanistan 1.16 million hectares, in Kyrgyzstan 
100,000 hectares, in Tajikistan, 500,000 hectares, in Turkmenistan 1,700,000 
hectares, in Uzbekistan 2, 300,000 hectares. Stuart Horsman, Afghanistan and 
Transboundary Water Management on the Amu Darya: A Political History, 
CENTRAL ASIAN WATERS-PART 2: RESEARCH PAPERS, WATER & DEVELOPMENT 
PUBLICATIONS-HELSINKI UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY 64, available at 
http://water.tkk.fi/English/wr/research/global/material/CA_chapters/06-
CA_Waters-Horsman.pdf. Cotton’s nickname in the region is “White Gold.” 
GRANIT supra note 1 at 23. Central Asian cotton accounts for nearly 15 percent 
of the globally-traded total. Id. at 22-23. 
75 ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 39; GRANIT supra note 1, at 16. 
76 GRANIT supra note 1, at 25. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. Turkmenistan has promised to provide free water through 2030. 
Turkmen get free gas, power, water through ’30: Leader of Turkmenistan 
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the Amu Darya’s waters from their Aral Sea delta to evaporate in 
the cotton fields.
79
 As a result, approximately 90 percent of the 
Aral Sea’s original surface waters vanished between 1960 and 
2007.
80
 The Aral’s disappearance has caused severe 
environmental damage to the region.
81
 More than 33,000 km
2
 of 
former seabed is now inundated with agricultural chemicals.
82
 
Fourth, Turkmenistan's “Altyn Asyr” or “Golden Age” Lake is a 
massive, $6 billion project
83
 designed to fill the Karashor 
Depression in Northern Turkmenistan.
84
 Some regional 
observers worry that Turkmenistan will divert fresh water from 
the Amu Darya to fill the Lake rather than using farm runoff, 
which could exacerbate tensions over between Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan.
85
 
 
C.   Energy as Source of Conflict 
Energy and water cause two main conflicts in the Amu 
Darya Basin: (1) current conflicts as the downstream countries, 
especially Uzbekistan, seek to preserve the current water 
withdrawal limits that provide them with approximately 80 
percent of the Amu Darya’s water resources for free and that 
force the upstream states, especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
                                                                                                 
extends promise made in ’93 for 10 more years, NBCNEWS.COM (Oct. 25, 
2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15421290/ns/world_news-wonderful_ 
world/t/turkmen-get-free-gas-power-water-through/#.UNXFe3fhfZB. 
79 GRANIT supra note 1, at 15, 25. 
80 Id. at 15. 
81 Id. at 15-16. 
82 Sergei Vinogradov, Managing transboundary water resources in the 
Aral Sea Basin: in search of a solution, 1 INT’L J. GLOBAL ENVT’L ISSUES no. 
3/4, 345, 347 (2001), available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/ 
bibliography/IJGEI/07ijgenvl2001v1n34vinogradov.pdf. 
83 Richard Stone, A New Great Lake—or Dead Sea? 320 Science, No. 
5879, 1002, 1002 (2008), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/ 
320/5879/1002.full. 
84 Andrey G. Kostianoy et al., Satellite Monitoring of Water Resources in 
Turkmenistan, 15 INT’L WATER TECH. CONF. in Alexandria, Egypt, 10 (2011), 
available at http://iwtc.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/G17.pdf. 
85 Stone, supra note 83, at 1005.  
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to purchase electricity and gas from them
86
; and (2) potential 
conflicts as the upstream countries, including Afghanistan,
87
 seek 
to exploit the Amu Darya’s immense hydroelectric potential,88 
which could harm the Uzbek agricultural sector.
89 
 
In Central Asia, water and energy are used as political 
weapons.
90
 For example, in 2000-2001, when Uzbekistan cut off 
energy supplies to Kyrgyzstan in order to secure a higher 
payment, Kyrgyzstan retaliated by threatening to open the gates 
of its dams to flood Uzbek farmland.
91
 The following year, when 
Uzbekistan changed the price for gas and electricity,
92
 
Kyrgyzstan responded by attempting to charge Uzbekistan a fee 
for water originating on Kyrgyz territory.
93
 When Uzbekistan 
closed most of the border checkpoints with Tajikistan and 
                                                 
86 See Peyrouse, supra note 23; Michael Wines, Grand Soviet Scheme for 
Sharing Water in Central Asia Foundering, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/09/world/grand-soviet-scheme-for-sharing-
water-in-central-asia-is-foundering.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
87 See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
WATERCOURSES 277 (2d ed. 2007). 
88 Dammed if they do, ECONOMIST, Sept. 29, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21563764 [hereinafter Dammed if they do]; 
see GRANIT, supra note 1, at 20-21. There is an installed capacity of 42,598 
Megawatts [MW] in the Aral Sea Basin, with the potential to develop 524,400 
MW. Id. at 21. The hydroelectric potential of the Amu Darya States is as 
follows: Afghanistan 400 MW, Kyrgyzstan 163,000 MW, Tajikistan 317,000 
MW, Turkmenistan 2000 MW, and Uzbekistan 15,000 MW. Id. The installed 
capacity of hydropower is as follows: Afghanistan 595 MW, Kyrgyzstan, 
10,778 MW, Tajikistan, 15,086 MW, Turkmenistan 0 MW, and Uzbekistan at 
7278 MW. Id. In 2006, energy ministers from Tajikistan, Iran, and Afghanistan 
agreed to erect a power line that could provide electricity to Afghanistan, Iran, 
Pakistan, India, and China. ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 48. 
89 Diloram Abdullaeva, Uzbekistan to lose $600m a year due to Rogun 
Dam, THE NATION, Sept. 24, 2012, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-
newspaper-daily-english-online/business/24-Sep-2012/uzbekistan-to-lose-
600m-a-year-due-to-rogun-dam. 
90 Peyrouse, supra note 23. 
91 Wines, supra note 86. 
92 Dammed if they do, supra note 88. 
93 Gregory E. Heltzer, Stalemate in the Aral Sea Basin: Will Kyrgyzstan’s 
New Water Law Bring the Downstream Nations Back to the Multilateral 
Bargaining Table?, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 291, 306, 309 (2003). 
“Viewing water as an economic commodity is highly controversial in 
international watercourse law.” McCaffrey, supra note 87, at 283-84. 
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Kyrgyzstan and mined parts of the Tajik border,
94
 Tajikistan 
responded by covertly resuming construction on the Rogun 
Dam
95
 and seeking alternate energy sources.
96
 Unsurprisingly, in 
2012, the leader of Uzbekistan claimed that hydropower projects 
such as the Rogun Dam “could lead to ‘not just serious 
confrontation, but even wars’”97 because the alteration of the 
Amu Darya’s water flows could impact the Uzbek economy by 
as much as $600 million per year and up to 336,000 lost jobs.
98
  
Afghanistan’s inflow contributions and growing population 
will impact the Basin’s future, although estimates of 
Afghanistan’s future water demands vary wildly, from 6 km3 to 
16 km
3
.
99
 No agreement explicitly forbids Afghanistan’s 
appropriation of Amu Darya water, although withdrawing water 
might violate Articles 7 and 16 of the 1958 Frontier Agreement 
which governed Amu Darya water allocation between the USSR 
and Afghanistan.
100
 “As successor states to the USSR, the Soviet 
Successor States inherited the rights and responsibilities of the 
Agreements.”101 While Afghanistan is not currently included in 
any of the Amu Darya Basin’s water resource management 
bodies,
102
 both Afghanistan and the Soviet Successor States seek 
to actively engage each other on transboundary water 
                                                 
94 Dammed if they do, supra note 88. 
95 Abdullaeva, supra note 89. 
96 Toralieva, supra note 23. 
97 Dammed if they do, supra note 88. Uzbekistan has courted regional 
leaders to block completion of the Rogun Dam. Uzbek President to Visit 
Turkmenistan, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY [RFE/RL] (Sept. 30, 2012), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/uzbek-president-to-visit-
turkmenistan/24724530.html. 
98 Abdullaeva, supra note 89. 
99 Horsman, supra note 74, 64, 67-68. 
100 Id. at 69; see Treaty concerning the regime of the frontier between the 
two countries, Afg. & U.S.S.R. (Jan. 18, 1958), in U.N. Secretary-General, 
Legal problems relating to the use of international rivers, ¶¶ 386-98, U.N. Doc. 
A/5409, from Yearbook of I.L.C. Vol. II (1974) [hereinafter Frontier 
Agreement], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/ 
a_5409.pdf. 
101 Horsman, supra note 74, at 66; see Vinogradov, supra note 82, at 350. 
102 Horsman, supra note 74, at 66.  
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resources.
103
 For example, in 2011, Afghanistan indicated that it 
is “part of the solution for water related issues in Central 
Asia.”104 
 
III.  HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSE LAW 
Traditionally, uses of rivers and lakes have been divided 
into navigational and non-navigational categories.
105
 While there 
is a well-developed body of international treaty law regarding 
navigational uses of transboundary watercourses, “there is still 
no universal treaty in force that regulates the non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses.”106 However, through the 
work of legal scholars and the outcomes of court decisions, 
customary principles have emerged.
107
 The UNWC
108
 represents 
a codification of the customary principles of international 
transboundary non-navigable watercourse law.
109
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 29; Horsman, supra note 74, at 
71. 
104 Strengthening Transboundary Water Cooperation, supra note 62, ¶ 
17. 
105 Salman M.A. Salman, The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law, 23 
INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 625, 625 (Dec., 2007), available at 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/bibliography/articles/general/Salman-
BerlinRules.pdf. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 UNWC, supra note 11. 
109 Salman, supra note 105, at 625; Status of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Oct. 26, 2013, 5:11 
AM), [hereinafter Status of the UN Conv.] http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View 
Details.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
12&chapter=27&lang=en#Participants.  
2013] Weaponizing Water 427 
 
A.  International Law Generally 
 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice establishes the four sources of international law.
110
 
International law features three primary sources: (1) 
International conventions (treaties), (2) “‘international custom, 
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and (3) the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.’” 
Secondary sources of international law include: “‘judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists.’”111 To be considered binding, a customary law must 
be evidenced both by widespread state practice and by opinio 
juris—states acting in a certain way because the state feels 
legally bound to do so.
112
 Evidence of customary law is 
discovered in “agreements, statutes and decrees, diplomatic 
correspondence, statements of states’ representatives in 
international organizations and conferences, and so forth.”113 
 
B.  Customary International Watercourse Law 
The primary customary obligations of international 
watercourse law are the obligations of states to use 
transboundary water resources in an “equitable and reasonable 
manner, and to avoid causing significant harm to other riparian 
states.”114 The theoretical foundation for these obligations is the 
principle of limited territorial sovereignty.
115
 Colloquially, 
limited territorial sovereignty means “the freedom to swing one’s 
                                                 
110 SERGEI VINOGRADOV ET AL., TRANSFORMING POTENTIAL CONFLICT 
INTO COOPERATION POTENTIAL: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW, 9-
10 (2003), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001332/ 
133258e.pdf.  
111 Id. at 10 (quoting Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38 
(1), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2 
&p3=0#CHAPTER_II. 
112 VINOGRADOV ET AL., supra note 110, at 9-10 (emphasis in original). 
113 Id. at 10. 
114 Id. at 12; See McCaffrey, supra note 87, at 135-47. 
115 See McCaffrey, supra note 87 at 133-37.  Limited territorial 
sovereignty is one of four main theories underlying international non-navigable 
watercourse law. See id. at 111-112.  
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fist ends where the other person’s nose begins.”116 Thus, “a state 
may develop its portion of an international watercourse” as long 
as any harm it causes to resource-sharers are minor and any 
injured States are duly compensated.
117
  
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers,
118
 which were drafted by the International 
Law Association (ILA) in 1966
119
 were the “first general 
codification of the law of international watercourses” and 
represent the “single most authoritative and widely quoted set of 
rules” governing international watercourses until the adoption of 
the UNWC.
120
 The Helsinki Rules codified the principle of 
equitable and reasonable use
121
 as well as the “obligation not to 
cause harm” to other States sharing the resource.122 
Judicial decisions also played an integral role in the 
development of customary transboundary watercourse law.
123
 In 
the principal case interpreting the modern law of non-navigable 
transboundary watercourses, the Gabčikovo-Nagymoros Case, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) expressly endorsed the 
UNWC.
124
 The case centered on a 1977 bilateral treaty between 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which concluded with the “goal of 
constructing” hydroelectric dams on the Danube River.125 The 
                                                 
116 Id. at 146. 
117 Id. 
118 Int’l L. Ass’n 52nd Conference, Helsinki, Fin., Aug. 1966, Helsinki 
Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, (1967) [hereinafter 
Helsinki Rules], available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/ 
intldocs/helsinki_rules.html.. 
119 VINOGRADOV ET AL., supra note 110, at 12. The earliest attempts to 
codify the law of non-navigable international watersources included the 
Institute of International Law's (IIL) 1911 Declaration of Madrid and the 
subsequent Salzburg Resolution. Id.; Salman, supra note 105, at 628. 
120 Salman, supra note 105, at 630. 
121 VINOGRADOV ET AL., supra note 110, at 13. “Each basin State is 
entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial 
uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.” Helsinki Rules supra 
note 118, art. 4.   
122 Salman, supra note 105, at 630. 
123 VINOGRADOV ET AL., supra note 110, at 13. 
124 Gabčikovo-Nagymoros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 
25, 1997), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf. 
125 VINOGRADOV ET AL., supra note 110 at 13-14. 
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goal was not realized because Hungary unilaterally stopped 
working on the project.
126
 Slovakia (Czechoslovakia) retaliated 
by diverting “for its use and benefit between 80 and 90 percent 
of the [transboundary] waters” of the Danube.127 The ICJ ordered 
the project restarted and each of the parties to compensate the 
other.
128
 The ICJ viewed the UNWC as codifying the customary 
law of transboundary non-navigable watercourses
129
 and 
recognized the preeminence of the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization as expressed in the Helsinki Rules.
130
 
 
IV.  U.N. WATERCOURSES CONVENTION 
The UNWC “is intended to be a framework instrument of 
global applicability.”131 It guides future regional or watercourse 
specific agreements, assists implementing existing agreements 
by providing interpretation of key terms, can govern if the 
particular watercourse has no watercourse-specific agreement, 
and complements environmental conventions such as the United 
Nations Convention on Combating Desertification (UNCCD).
132
 
The substantive provisions of the UNWC include “equitable and 
reasonable utilization and participation,” the “obligation not to 
cause significant harm . . . to other watercourse states,” the 
“general obligation to cooperate,” and to exchange information 
on a regular basis.
133
 
 
                                                 
126 Id. at 14. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 McCaffrey, supra note 87, at 150. 
130 Salman, supra note 105, at 634. 
131 Stephen C. McCaffrey, Foreword to ALISTAIR RIEU-CLARKE ET AL., 
UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION USER'S GUIDE 10 (2012), available at 
http://www.gwp.org/Global/ToolBox/References/UN%20Watercourses%20Co
nvention;%20User%C2%B4s%20Guide%20(IHP-
HELP%20Centre%20for%20Water%20Law,%20Policy%20and%20Science,%
20Dundee%20University,%202012).pdf. 
132 World Wildlife Fund, Everything you need to know about the UN 
Watercourses Convention, 14-15 (2009), http://www.unwater.org/downloads/ 
wwf_un_watercourses_brochure_for_web_1.pdf (Flavia Loures et al.). 
133 VINOGRADOV ET. AL., supra note 110, at 84-85. 
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A.  U.N. Watercourses Convention Status 
In 1997, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the 
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses.
134
 The vote was 106 for, 3 against 
and twenty-seven abstentions.
135
 The UNWC remained open for 
signature until May 20, 2000,
136
 has not yet entered into force, 
and currently has sixteen signatories and thirty-one parties.
137
 
While the signing period has closed, states may still become 
parties to the UNWC by depositing an instrument of ratification, 
accession, or approval with the U.N. Treaty Depository.
138
 The 
UNWC will enter into force on the “ninetieth day following the 
date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession.”139   
 
B.  Principles of the U.N. Watercourses Convention 
The preamble to the UNWC categorizes the UNWC as a 
codification treaty designed to track the “progressive 
development” of the international law regarding the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses.
140
 The preamble 
also notes that the UNWC is a framework convention designed 
for the “promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilization” of 
international watercourses
141
 and emphasizes the importance of 
                                                 
134 Id. See G.A. Res 51/229, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (May 21, 1997), 
available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/res/51/229. 
135 U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th plen. mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.99 
(May 21, 1997) (vote on draft resolution A/51/PV.99 which was adopted as 
G.A. Res 51/229) [hereinafter UNWC Voting Record]. After the official tallied 
the votes at 103 for, Fiji, Nigeria, and Belgium stated they had intended to vote 
in favor. Id.  
136 See Stephen C. McCaffrey, Procedural History: Convention on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Audiovisual 
Library of International Law (2008), http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/clnuiw/ 
clnuiw.html. 
137 Status of the UN Conv., supra note 108. 
138 Id. 
139 Id.; see McCaffrey, supra note 136. 
140 UNWC, supra note 11, pmbl. para. 3. 
141 Id. pmbl. para. 5.   
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cooperation and “good-neighbourliness” in transboundary 
watercourse law.
142
 Finally, the preamble references the 
“principles and recommendations adopted by the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development of 1992 in the 
Rio Declaration.”143  
The scope of the UNWC establishes the nature and extent of 
the transboundary watercourse obligations parties undertake.
144
 
A “watercourse” is defined in Article 2 as “a system of surface 
waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical 
relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a 
common terminus.”145 An “international watercourse” is defined 
as “a watercourse, parts of which are situated in different 
States.”146 The UNWC applies to a “watercourse system” 
including the glaciers that form the headwaters as well as every 
place the water originating in that system flows or is stored.
147
  
The operative provisions of the UNWC express the 
obligations of parties. Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the UNWC 
articulate the substantive provisions of the UNWC derived from 
customary international watercourse law.
148
 Articles 8, 9, and 11-
19 oblige parties to cooperate, share information, and inform 
other riparians about planned projects on the watercourse.
149
 
Articles 20-26 describe the environmental obligations of 
parties.
150
 Finally, Article 33 explains the UNWC’s dispute 
settlement mechanisms.
151
 
 
                                                 
142 Id. pmbl. para. 6. 
143 Id. pmbl. para. 8. 
144 Rieu-Clarke et al., supra note 131, at 67. 
145 UNWC, supra note 11, art. 2. 
146 Id. art. 2. 
147 ATTILLA TANZI & MAURIZIO ARCARI, THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 58 (2001). 
148 UNWC, supra note 11, arts. 5-7. 
149 Id. arts. 8, 9, 11-19. 
150 Id. arts. 20-26. 
151 Id. art. 33. 
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V. APPLYING THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION TO THE 
AMU DARYA RIPARIANS 
As a codification of customary international watercourse 
law, the UNWC expresses the current international 
understanding of the law of non-navigable transboundary 
watercourses and would be particularly helpful in addressing the 
conflicts stemming from the “water-energy nexus.” The UNWC 
has already demonstrated considerable influence on international 
watercourse treaties, both bilateral and multilateral.
152
 Since the 
UNWC has not yet entered into force, its provisions would be 
unenforceable as treaty obligations against the Amu Darya states 
that are not parties to it.
153
 However, the UNWC would apply to 
the Amu Darya states as a matter of binding customary 
international law.
154
 A treaty rule may bind states not parties to a 
treaty when “the treaty rule is declaratory of pre-existing 
custom[].”155 The UNWC obliges the Amu Darya states as 
customary international law because, as a codification treaty, it is 
declaratory of existing customary law.
156
  Its definitions and 
                                                 
152 Salman M.A. Salman, The United Nations Watercourses Convention 
Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into Force Proven Difficult?, 32 WATER 
INT’L 1, 12 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/ 
bibliography/articles/general/Salman-UNWatercoursesConventionTen 
Years.pdf. 
153 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 18, 24-25, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention], available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
Whatever Amu Darya States that become Parties to the UNWC would have an 
obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the UNWC in between 
expressing consent to be bound by the UNWC and the UNWC’s entry into 
force. Id. art. 18. 
154 LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 118 (5th ed. 2009).  
155 Id. (citing North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 20); 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14, 14 (June 27).  
156 UNWC, supra note 11, pmbl. para. 3; Stephen C. McCaffrey, 
Introductory Note: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, Audiovisual Library of International Law (2008), 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/clnuiw/clnuiw.html. 
2013] Weaponizing Water 433 
 
substantive obligations were taken from the Helsinki Rules, 
which are considered customary international watercourse 
law,
157
 the UNWC was drafted over the course of decades, which 
provided sufficient time for the UNWC to encapsulate customary 
international law, the UNWC received widespread support in the 
U.N. General Assembly voting record,
158
 and the ICJ has 
explicitly endorsed the UNWC as customary international law in 
the Gabčikovo-Nagymoros Case.159  
 
A.  Ratification Status among Riparians 
Currently, only Uzbekistan is a party to the UNWC, 
acceding to it on September 4, 2007.
160
 Since its accession, it has 
urged other states sharing the Amu Darya to accede to the 
Convention.
161
 Of the Amu Darya riparians, Uzbekistan 
abstained from voting while Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Tajikistan were absent.
162
 The other Amu Darya states, including 
Afghanistan, have endorsed the principles underlying the UNWC 
and have all expressed their willingness to strengthen 
cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) and its 1992 Convention on 
transboundary watercourses.
163
 
                                                 
157 See Salman, supra note 105, at 630. 
158 See UNWC Voting Record supra note 135; see Status of the UN 
Conv., supra note 109. 
159 See supra note 124. 
160 Status of the UN Conv., supra note 109. 
161 Strengthening Transboundary Water Cooperation, supra note 62, ¶ 
16.  
162 Alistair Rieu-Clarke et al., UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION USER’S 
GUIDE 37 (2012), available at http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/391260/ 
UN%20Watercourses%20Convention%20-%20User%27s%20Guide.pdf. The 
vote of Kyrgyzstan is not accounted for and was thus probably one of the 
absentee states. Id. 
163 United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17,1992, 1936 
U.N.T.S. 269 (entered into force Oct. 6, 1996) [hereinafter UNECE 
Convention], available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/ 
pdf/watercon.pdf; Strengthening Transboundary Water Cooperation, supra 
note 62, ¶¶ 12-18. 
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B.  The Amu Darya States Should Become Parties to 
the UNWC 
Adopting the UNWC as a framework convention for 
managing the Amu Darya’s water resources will a valuable tool 
assisting the Amu Darya countries in addressing problems 
stemming from the “water-energy nexus.” Adopting the UNWC 
would preempt conflicts over using the Amu Darya’s waters for 
irrigated agriculture or energy by providing the riparians the 
scientific tools needed to evaluate, measure, and allocate water 
resources appropriately to each riparian for particular uses, 
would provide dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts amicably when they do arise, and would encourage 
international cooperation and inject international expertise into 
the Amu Darya’s water-sharing issues. The Amu Darya States 
should adopt the UNWC as a framework convention forming the 
basis for management of the water resources in the Amu Darya 
Basin for seven reasons:
 
(1) the UNWC would facilitate drafting 
a transboundary water convention targeted at the Amu Darya; (2) 
the UNWC would facilitate strengthening the Amu Darya's water 
management institutions; (3) the UNWC would assist with 
engaging Afghanistan; (4) the UNWC would help the Amu 
Darya States meet their obligations under regional and 
international agreements; (5) the UNWC would not affect the 
rights and obligations of Amu Darya States; (6) the UNWC 
would help the Amu Darya States meet their monitoring and 
information-sharing obligations; and (7) the UNWC would 
provide a set of dispute resolution procedures.  
 
 
 
 
1.  Becoming Parties to the UNWC Would Facilitate 
Drafting a Regional, Basin-Level Treaty 
 
Adopting the UNWC would assist the drafting of a regional 
convention on the Amu Darya in three ways: (1) providing a set 
of common definitions of key terms, (2) creating a framework 
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from which to engage other States, and (3) establishing a 
platform from which to engage the international community. 
The Amu Darya States have repeatedly stated their desire to 
draft a Basin-level treaty for the region.
164
 For example, a major 
component of Aral Sea Basin Program-3 (“ASBP-3”) involves 
improving the legal framework of water resources management 
through drafting a regional treaty.
165
 To update the legal scheme 
for the Amu Darya, the IFAS and Amu Darya States have chosen 
to develop a “Regional Water Convention for the Aral Sea 
basin.”166 Because “the problem of shared use of water resources 
in Central Asia is becoming a serious obstacle in settling 
regional and local conflicts,” the Amu Darya States realized that 
they “have no choice but to find a way of forming a regional 
agreement on the sharing of water resources.”167 The Amu Darya 
States emphasized their goal of drafting a regional agreement in 
the Nukus Declaration, Tashkent Statement and 2009 Joint 
Statement.
168
 
Adopting the UNWC would help the Amu Darya riparians 
draft a regional convention by providing a set of common 
definitions.
169
 The 1992 Almaty Agreement, 1993 Kyzl-Orda 
Agreement, and 2006 Sustainable Development Convention all 
fail to define a “watercourse,” “transboundary watercourse,” or 
“watercourse system.”170 Agreeing to use the UNWC’s 
definitions of these key terms would simplify drafting the 
proposed regional convention, as the negotiators would be 
conducting negotiations with defined terms and with a common 
                                                 
164 See Nukus Declaration, supra note 57, art. 1; see also Tashkent 
Statement, supra note 60, art. 3. 
165 ASBP-3, supra note 30, at 10-11. 
166 Id. at 16. 
167 Id. at 86. 
168 Nukus Declaration, supra note 57; Tashkent Statement, supra note 60; 
Joint Statement, supra note 32. 
169 Dinara Ziganshina, The Role and Relevance of the 1997 UN 
Convention to the Countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan in the Aral Sea 
Basin, TOWARDS THE 6 WORLD WATER FORUM — COOPERATIVE ACTIONS FOR 
WATER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, http://www.cawater-
info.net/6wwf/conference_tashkent2011/files/discussion_note_role_convention
_eng.pdf. 
170 Id. at 23-25; Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 11-12. 
436 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22:1 
 
understanding of the scope and applicability of the instrument.
171
 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan have 
already endorsed the UNWC’s “ecosystem approach” to water 
resource management in the Nukus and Almaty Declarations.
172
 
The application of the UNWC to a “watercourse system” or 
“drainage basin” comports with the Almaty Agreement's 
requirement of “rational” water use and the desire among the 
Central Asian States to manage the Amu Darya according to 
international water law principles.
173
 Becoming parties to the 
UNWC would clarify the relationship between the Almaty 
Agreement's undefined “rational and economic use”174 in the 
context of the UNWC’s obligation of “equitable utilization and 
participation.”175 The list of factors to be considered in 
evaluating “equitable utilization” contained in Article 6 of the 
UNWC would prove especially useful to the Amu Darya States 
in updating the water resource allocation model from one 
centered on cotton production and political interdependence to 
one that recognizes and weighs the needs of the various 
economic sectors of independent States.
176
 
The UNWC would assist in drafting a regional agreement 
by serving as a “universally agreed legal framework from which 
to start negotiations.”177 The UNWC’s core obligations of 
cooperation, “equitable and reasonable utilization and 
participation,” and the “obligation not to cause significant harm” 
would serve as useful bases from which the Amu Darya riparians 
could update the legal framework of the Amu Darya.
178
 These 
                                                 
171 Ziganshina, supra note 169, at 11-12, 23-24. 
172 Almaty Declaration, Feb. 28, 1997, in International Fund for Saving 
the Aral Sea Executive Committee [EC-IFAS] 10 years IFAS (decisions and 
events) 91-92 (2003) [hereinafter Almaty Declaration], available at 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1773_VL102306.pdf; Nukus Declaration, 
supra note 57. 
173  See Almaty Agreement, supra note 18, art. 10. 
174  See id. 
175  See UNWC, supra note 11, arts. 5-6. 
176  See UNWC, supra note 11, art. 6. 
177 Alistair Rieu-Clarke & Flavia Rocha Loures, Still not in Force: 
Should States Support the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention?, 18 REV. EUR. 
CMTY. & INT’L ENVT’L L. 185 (2009).   
178  Ziganshina, supra note 169, at 12-15, 23-25. 
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core principles would guide the Amu Darya riparians in 
determining how best to sustainably manage the watercourse.
179
 
Adopting the UNWC would help the Amu Darya riparians 
engage with the international community because the parties 
would use internationally-accepted definitions, norms, and 
understandings as the basis of negotiations.
180
 Engagement with 
the international community constitutes a core component in 
each of the Nukus Declaration, 2004 Memorandum of 
Understanding, U.N. General Assembly IFAS observer status 
resolution, and the Berlin Process.
181
 
 
2.  Becoming Parties to the UNWC Would Facilitate 
Strengthening the Amu Darya's Water Management 
Institutions 
 
Acceding to the UNWC would help the Amu Darya states 
reform and strengthen the institutions responsible for water 
management in the Amu Darya Basin.
182
 The 1995 Nukus 
Declaration, 2002 Dushanbe Declaration, and 2009 Joint 
Statement all state the intent of the Amu Darya states to improve 
and strengthen the organization of the water management 
hierarchy in order to improve resource management and 
information-sharing in the Amu Darya Basin.
183
 The UNWC 
                                                 
179  Id. at 23-25. 
180 Rieu-Clarke & Loures, supra note 177, at 27-31; Strengthening IFAS, 
supra note 28, at 20-23, 37. 
181 Observer Status Resolution, supra note 66; Nukus Declaration, supra 
note 57; Berlin Process, supra note 67; Memorandum of Understanding, supra 
note 65. 
182 Agreement Between the Government of Republic of Kazakhstan, The 
Government of Kyrgyz Republic, The Government of Republic of Tajikistan, 
the Government of Turkmenistan and the Government of Republic of 
Uzbekistan about the Status of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea 
(IFAS) and Its Organizations, April 9, 1999, in International Fund for Saving 
the Aral Sea Executive Committee [EC-IFAS] 10 years IFAS (decisions and 
events), 109-14 (2003) [hereinafter IFAS Agreement], available at 
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/1773_VL102306.pdf; see Strengthening 
IFAS, supra note 28, at 3-5, 14-20, 23-29. 
183 Dushanbe Declaration, supra note 58; Nukus Declaration, supra note 
57; Joint Statement, supra note 32. 
438 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22:1 
 
would help the Amu Darya states streamline and strengthen 
water management in the Amu Darya in three ways: (1) 
improving cooperation among the IFAS, ICWC, and ICSD, (2) 
coordinating information-sharing and monitoring efforts across 
economic sectors, and (3) defining the responsibilities and 
hierarchy of the IFAS, ICWC, and ICSD.
184
 
 Article 8 of the UNWC elaborates the general obligation 
of states to cooperate in managing transboundary 
watercourses.
185
 It also contemplates establishing joint 
commissions in order to attain the “optimal utilization” and 
“adequate protection” of the watercourse.186 Becoming parties to 
the UNWC would oblige the Amu Darya states to ensure that the 
management hierarchy of the Amu Darya would cooperate to 
realize the obligations of contained in Articles 5-7 of the 
UNWC.
187
 Under the UNWC, the IFAS, ICWC, and ICSD 
would be obligated to work together, improving coordination 
among the three organizations.
188
  
 Article 9 of the UNWC establishes an obligation on 
parties to share information relating to the Basin as a whole, 
considering the relevant stakeholders.
189
 Currently, the ICSD and 
ICWC need not collaborate with the energy, meteorological, or 
environmental protection sectors.
190
 Furthermore, the ICWC’s 
mandate only extends to the “middle and lower parts” of the 
Amu Darya, not to the headwaters or tributaries.
191
 The lack of 
coordination caused by the absence of the energy, environmental 
protection, and meteorological sectors from the ICWC results in 
shortages and surpluses of water because the ICWC does not 
incorporate projected precipitation amounts or future energy or 
agricultural demands into its water allocation plans.
192
 UNWC 
                                                 
184 See Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 3-4. 
185 UNWC, supra note 11, art. 8. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. arts. 5-8; Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 35-37. 
188 UNWC, supra note 11, arts. 5-7; Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, 
at 35-37. 
189 UNWC, supra note 11, art. 9. 
190 Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 17. 
191 Id. at 17-18. 
192 Id. 
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Article 9 would add teeth to the IFAS regulations that require the 
IFAS to implement environmental monitoring systems and 
engage in joint environmental protection initiatives.
193
 Adopting 
the UNWC approach would enable the IFAS, ICWC, and ICSD 
to streamline water resource management.
194
  
 The UNWC would also help the Amu Darya states 
define the responsibilities for the IFAS, ICWC, and ICSD.
195
 
Currently, these three organizations, though operating 
independently, have overlapping mandates and do not have 
delineated duties.
196
 Defining the roles of these organizations 
under the auspices of UNWC Articles 20-26
197
 would forestall 
disputes within these organizations and would help the Amu 
Darya states more effectively meet their obligations under 
various Multilateral Environmental Treaties like the UNCCD,
198
 
                                                 
193 UNWC, supra note 11, art. 9; Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 
14; Regulations of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, (Apr. 9, 
1999), in INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR SAVING THE ARAL SEA EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE [EC-IFAS] 10 YEARS IFAS (DECISIONS AND EVENTS), 116-20 (2003) 
[hereinafter IFAS Regulations], available at http://www.preventionweb.net/ 
files/1773_VL102306.pdf. 
194 See Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 21-23, 35-37. 
195 Ziganshina, supra note 169, at 26-27; Strengthening IFAS, supra note 
28, at 23-29. 
196 Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 15, 17. 
197 UNWC, supra note 11, arts. 20-26. 
198 See, e.g., Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 
arts. 10, 16, Oct. 14, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-29, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3, 
(entered into force Dec. 26, 1996) [hereinafter UNCCD], available at 
http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/conventionText/conv-
eng.pdf; UNCCD, Update on Ratification of the UNCCD, SECRETARIAT OF THE 
UN CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION (May 12, 2012) [hereinafter 
UNCCD Ratification], available at, http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocument 
Library/convention/ratification-eng.pdf; UNCCD, Subregional Action 
Programme for the Central Asian Countries on Combating Desertification 
within the UNCCD Context, UNCCD (Sept. 3, 2003) [hereinafter 
UNCCD/SRAP], http://www.unccd.int/ActionProgrammes/srapcd-eng 
2003.pdf. The UNCCD is an outgrowth of the Rio Declaration and directly 
utilizes its development principles. UNCCD, About the Convention, UNCCD 
(2012), http://www.unccd.int/en/about-the-convention/ 
Pages/About-the-Convention.aspx; see also Günther Handl, Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment Stockholm, (Jun. 16, 
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as well as their obligations under the Almaty Agreement,
199
 and 
the IFAS Regulations.
200
    
 
3.  The Amu Darya States Have Already Endorsed the 
Principles of the UNWC 
 
The Amu Darya states explicitly support the principles of 
the UNWC for the following reasons: (1) the Amu Darya states 
have endorsed the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, (2) the 
UNWC is derived from the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, (3) 
Integrated Water Resources Management is a key tenet of 
Agenda 21, (4) the Amu Darya states have endorsed Integrated 
Water Resources Management, and (5) Integrated Water 
Resources Management is a core principle of the UNWC.
201
  
The Heads of State of the Central Asian nations approved 
the principles of the Rio Declaration
202
 in the Nukus Declaration 
and, in the Almaty Declaration, indicated their support of 
Agenda 21 and the ecosystem approach to water resource 
management.
203
 The Rio Declaration of 1992 indicates the 
                                                                                                 
1972), Rio Declaration on Environment and Development Rio de Janeiro, (Jun. 
14, 1992), AUDIOVISUAL LIB. OF INT’L L. (2008), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/dunche/dunche.html.  
199 See Almaty Agreement, supra note 18. 
200 See IFAS Regulations, supra note 193. 
201 See generally infra notes 202-206, 219, 223 (describing obligations 
under various Multilateral Environmental Agreements, the UNWC, and various 
regional agreements). 
202 See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., Jun. 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (Jun. 14, 1992), in REPORT OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.151/26 (Vol. I) Annex I, (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration], 
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-
1annex1.htm; G.A. Res. 47/190, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/190 (Dec. 22, 1992) 
(adopted without vote), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/ 
r47.htm (listing the Principles of the Rio Declaration). 
203 Nukus Declaration, supra note 57; Almaty Declaration, supra note 
172; Protection of the quality and supply of freshwater resources: application 
of integrated approaches to the development, management and use of water 
resources, UN ENVT’L 
 PROGRAMME (1992), [hereinafter Agenda 21] http://www.unep.org/ 
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United Nations approach to sustainable development and 
environmental protection and Agenda 21 is the action plan 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly to implement 
the Rio Declaration.
204
 
They also emphasized the need for regional cooperation, 
especially with international organizations in the Tashkent 
Declaration, Ashgabat Declaration, Dushanbe Declaration, and 
the Memorandum of Understanding
205
 as well as the need for 
holistic, sustainable development in the 1992 Almaty 
Agreement, 1993 Kyzl-Orda Agreement, and 2006 Sustainable 
Development Convention.
206
 
The Preamble of the UNWC notes that the UNWC’s 
substantive obligations are derived from the core principles 
elaborated in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 2 and are all 
dedicated to the sustainable use of water resources.
207
 The first 
principle of the Rio Declaration indicates that human beings 
should be the center of a sustainable development regime.
208
 The 
UNWC incorporates this principle into its considerations of the 
relationship between “equitable utilization” and “no harm” 
where there is a conflict of uses by giving “vital human needs” a 
                                                                                                 
documents.multilingual/default.asp?DocumentID=52&ArticleID=66&l=en; 
G.A. Res. 47/190, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/190 (Dec. 22, 1992) (adopted without 
vote) (approving agenda 21), available at http://www.unep.org/Documents. 
Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=52. 
204 Rio Declaration, supra note 202, at paras. 1-4; Agenda 21, supra note 
203, at paras. 1.1-1.7. 
205 Tashkent Declaration for the UN Special Programme for the 
Economies of Central Asia [SPECA], (Mar. 26, 1998) [hereinafter Tashkent 
Declaration], available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/SPECA/ 
documents/tashkent/tashkent_declaration_en.pdf; Ashgabat Declaration, Apr. 
9, 1999, in INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR SAVING THE ARAL SEA EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE [EC-IFAS] 10 YEARS IFAS (DECISIONS AND EVENTS) 130-32 (2003) 
[hereinafter Ashgabat Declaration], available at. http://www.prevention 
web.net/files/1773_VL102306.pdf; Dushanbe Declaration, supra note 58; 
Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 65. 
206 See generally Almaty Agreement, supra note 18; Kyzl-Orda 
Agreement, supra note 46; Sustainable Development Convention, supra note 
46. 
207 UNWC, supra note 11, pmbl. para. 5. 
208 Rio Declaration, supra note 202, Principle 1. 
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special place.
209
 Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration indicates that 
environmental protection measures should form an integral part 
of any development program.
210
 Articles 20-26 of the UNWC 
elaborate how environmental protection provisions should 
considered in sustainable development.
211
 Additionally, Article 6 
of the UNWC includes environmental considerations as factors 
in “equitable utilization.”212 Principle 6 of the Rio Declaration 
gives a special place to developing countries and the Preamble of 
the UNWC notes the “special situation and needs of developing 
countries.”213 Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration compels states to 
cooperate to preserve and restore ecosystems.
214
 Article 8 of the 
UNWC requires states to cooperate on water resource 
management issues.
215
 Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration 
indicates that states should share scientific and technical 
information.
216
 Similarly, Article 9 of the UNWC also contains 
provisions on the regular exchange of data and information.
217
  
Article 18.1 of Agenda 21 demands the sustainable 
development of transboundary freshwater resources, utilizing the 
principles of Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM).
218
 IWRM “calls for the holistic management of 
freshwater as a finite and vulnerable resource, and the integration 
of sectoral water plans and programs within the framework of 
economic and social policy.”219  IWRM involves drafting long-
term sustainability strategies involving multiple stakeholders 
such as energy and agricultural stakeholders, the implementation 
                                                 
209 See UNWC, supra note 11, arts. 5-7, 10 (explaining the substantive 
obligations under the UNWC). 
210 Rio Declaration, supra note 202, arts. 5-7, 10. 
211 UNWC, supra note 11, arts. 20-26. 
212 Id. art. 6. 
213 Rio Declaration, supra note 202, Principle 6; UNWC pmbl. para. 
7, supra note 11. 
214 Rio Declaration, supra note 202, Principle 7. 
215 UNWC, supra note 11, art. 8. 
216 Rio Declaration, supra note 202, Principle 9. 
217 UNWC, supra note 11, art. 9. 
218 Agenda 21, supra note 203, art. 18.1. 
219  A. Dan Tarlock, Integrated Water Resources Management: Theory 
and Practice, in IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
IN CENTRAL ASIA 7 (Springer 2007). 
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of infrastructure projects, and developing “appropriate 
institutional, legal and financial mechanisms” coupling 
sustainable water use with economic growth.
220
 IWRM evaluates 
a river on the watercourse or system level.
221
 Furthermore, the 
Central Asian states endorsed IWRM as the chosen standard for 
sustainable water resource management for the Amu Darya in 
2011.
222
 By selecting IWRM as the method for evaluating 
sustainable water resource use, in accordance with their support 
of the Rio Declaration, the Amu Darya states also endorsed one 
of the key principles of the UNWC.
223
  
The 1993 Kyzl-Orda Agreement and the 2006 Sustainable 
Development Convention similarly give holistic, integrated 
management of resources primacy of place in managing water 
resources to protect the environment.
224
 Furthermore, IWRM 
constitutes a key component of the current Aral Sea Basin 
Program-3,
225
 incorporating an ecosystem-wide approach to 
water management in the Aral Sea Basin.
226
 ASBP-3 has been 
adopted by all member countries of the IFAS.
227
 Proposed 
IWRM projects include information exchange programs, 
developing regional and local plans for water use, as well as 
improving irrigation systems and management.
228
 Water 
management officials with the ICWC support IWRM as the most 
appropriate and effective water management system for the Amu 
Darya.
229
  
By endorsing the principles of Agenda 21, which include 
IWRM, the UNWC affirms that IWRM is the preferred method 
                                                 
220 Id. at 7-8. 
221 Id. at 6. 
222 Strengthening Transboundary Water Cooperation, supra note 62, ¶ 
18. 
223 UNWC, supra note 11, Annex. 
224Kyzl-Orda Agreement, supra note 46, art 1; Sustainable Development 
Convention, supra note 46, arts. 4-6. 
225 ASBP-3, supra note 30, at 4. 
226 Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 8.  The ASBP-3 program is 
designed to be implemented from 2011-2015.  ASBP-3, supra note 30, at 4. 
227 ASBP-3 has been signed by all countries of IFAS, EC IFAS (May 17, 
2012), http://www.ec-ifas.org/. 
228 ASBP-3, supra note 30, at 13-14. 
229 Khudaiberganov, supra note 33, at 42. 
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of managing water resources.
230
 The UNWC incorporates IWRM 
into its substantive obligations through its emphasis on 
cooperation and information exchange, as well as its balanced 
approach to “equitable utilization” as well as “equitable 
participation” of water resources.231 Becoming a party to the 
UNWC would demonstrate the commitment of the Amu Darya 
states to the principles they claim to endorse.
232
 
 
4.  Becoming Parties to the UNWC Would Provide a Set of 
Useful Dispute Resolution Procedures  
 
Further, becoming a party to the UNWC would enable Amu 
Darya riparians to utilize the UNWC’s flexible dispute resolution 
mechanisms.
233
 Under the Almaty Agreement, the ICWC 
resolves disputes internally and allows an impartial third party to 
be called to settle the dispute, but the Almaty Agreement 
provides no procedural details.
234
 The UNWC would allow the 
Amu Darya riparians to choose from a panoply of dispute 
settlement options.
235
 
 
5.  Becoming Parties to the UNWC Would Facilitate 
Engaging Afghanistan 
 
The UNWC would help the former Soviet states engage 
Afghanistan by applying to international watercourse the same 
sustainable management principles to which the Soviet successor 
states and Afghanistan are parties under the Frontier 
Agreement
236
 and several multilateral environmental [“MEA”] 
treaty obligations.
237
  
                                                 
230 UNWC, supra note 11, Annex. 
231 UNWC, supra note 11, arts. 5-7. 
232 See Ziganshina, supra note 169, at 23-25. 
233 Id. at 22. 
234 Id. at 21-22. 
235 See UNWC, supra note 11, art. 33. 
236 Frontier Agreement, supra note 100. 
237 See, e.g., UNCCD, supra note 198; Convention on Climate Change, 
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107  [hereinafter UNCCC], available at 
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Nearly 20 percent of the Amu Darya’s total flow originates 
in Afghanistan.
238
 However, Afghanistan has only developed 
approximately 2km
3
 of the 14.5 km
3
 of the Amu Darya’s waters 
that pass through its territory.
239
 Afghanistan is seeking to 
develop its watercourse resources, but is not yet a party to a 
regional watercourse agreement with the other Amu Darya 
states.
240
 However, both Afghanistan and the Amu Darya 
riparians have expressed an interest in more robust regional 
cooperation.
241
 For example, the IFAS members have recognized 
the importance of Afghanistan and expressed a desire for closer 
engagement with Afghanistan.
242
 Afghanistan conveyed an 
interest in incorporating the principles of international 
watercourse law into budding partnerships with other Central 
Asian nations at regional conferences on water management in 
the Aral Sea Basin in 2009 and 2010
243
 and in 2011.
244
 
 The long-term interests of the region would be best served 
by incorporating Afghanistan into the regional water 
management framework, which could be facilitated by the 
UNWC.
245
 As an introductory measure, cooperation could begin 
by including Afghanistan in regional structures at the technical 
and scientific level.
246
 The Amu Darya riparians could include 
Afghanistan in the negotiations for drafting the regional water 
                                                                                                 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf; Convention on Biological 
Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter UNCBD], available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf. 
238 GRANIT, supra note 1, at 15; Strengthening Transboundary Water 
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239 ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 44; GRANIT, supra note 1, at 15. Some 
studies estimate Afghanistan’s current water withdrawal at 5 km3. Horsman, 
supra note 74, at 64; Klemm & Shobair, supra note 39, at 4. 
240 See Ziganshina, supra note 169, at 4; Horsman, supra note 74, at 66-
67; Klemm & Shobair, supra note 39, at 10. 
241 Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 29; Horsman, supra note 74, at 
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242 ENVSEC, supra note 10, at 42. 
243 Id. at 77. 
244 TRANSBOUNDARY WATER COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA, supra note 
62, ¶¶ 12-18. 
245 Horsman, supra note 74, at 70-72. 
246 Id. at 72. 
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management convention for the Amu Darya.
247
 Rapprochement 
with Afghanistan on transboundary watercourses was recognized 
in the 1958 Frontier Agreement and the Soviet Successor States, 
“inherited the rights and responsibilities of the Agreement[]”248 
including the responsibility of cooperatively managing the Amu 
Darya.
249
  
Furthermore, Afghanistan and the Soviet Successor states 
are already mutually bound by several Multilateral 
Environmental Agreement (MEA) treaty obligations including 
the UNCCC, UNCBD, and UNCCC.
250
 Ecosystem-wide 
management and sustainable development principles of IWRM 
underlie each of the MEA agreements as well as the UNWC.
251
 
Afghanistan, as a party to the UNCCD, UNCBD, and UNCCC 
has already endorsed the principles of IWRM underlying the 
UNWC just as the former Soviet states have.
252
 Thus, the Amu 
Darya Riparians would be able to approach Afghanistan with a 
common understanding of their obligations to cooperate and 
sustainably manage the resources of the Amu Darya while 
utilizing the principles of IWRM and incorporating an ecosystem 
approach.
253
 
 
6.  Becoming Parties to the UNWC Would Not Affect the 
Rights and Obligations of Amu Darya States 
 
The UNWC will not affect the rights and obligations of the 
Amu Darya states for two reasons: (1) The UNWC does not alter 
the rights and obligations of transboundary watercourse states 
                                                 
247 Strengthening IFAS, supra note 28, at 29, 32, 40. 
248 Horsman, supra note 74, at 66. 
249 Vinogradov, supra note 82, at 350. 
250 UNCCD, supra note 198; UNCCC, supra note 237; UNCBD, supra 
note 237. 
251 See UNCCD, supra note 198, pmbl. para. 13, arts. 3-6, 9, 11-12; 
UNCCC, supra note 237, pmbl. ¶ 22, arts. 3-5; UNCBD, supra note 237, pmbl. 
paras. 20-23, arts. 5-7, 10; UNWC, supra note 11, pmbl. paras. 5-8, arts. 5-8, 
20-26; see also Tarlock, supra note 219, at 8. 
252 UNCCD Ratification, supra note 198. 
253 Rieu-Clarke & Loures, supra note 177, at 188-92; Loures et al., supra 
note 132, at 18-21. 
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without their consent, and (2) Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are 
already parties to regional Conventions with stricter obligations 
than the UNWC.
254
  
Becoming a party to the UNWC will not supersede the 
rights and obligations of the current water management regime
255
 
because the UNWC does not abrogate existing agreements 
without the consent of the parties.
256
 Article 3 of the UNWC 
explains that, if the obligations of the UNWC and those of 
existing agreements governing a watercourse conflict, then the 
obligations in the prior instruments govern.
257
 The UNWC’s 
substantive obligations of equitable and reasonable utilization 
and participation, the obligation not to cause significant harm, 
and the obligations to cooperate and exchange information 
comport, but do not conflict, with the substantive obligations 
contained in the Almaty Agreement.
258
  
In addition, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have already 
acceded to the UNECE Convention on Transboundary 
Watercourses,
259
 which entails stricter obligations than the 
UNWC.
260
 Because the UNWC is a framework convention while 
the UNECE Convention is a regional convention, the UNECE 
Convention describes its obligations and duties with a higher 
level of detail.
261
 Because the UNECE and UNWC Conventions 
                                                 
254 Status of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION 
(Nov. 11, 2013, 5:01 AM) [hereinafter UNECE Treaty Status], 
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258 See id. arts. 5-10; Almaty Agreement, supra note 18, arts. 1-7. 
259 UNECE Treaty Status, supra note 254. 
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complement each other, becoming a party to both would help 
strengthen the legal regime of the Amu Darya Basin and would 
help the legal framework of the Amu Darya accord with 
international norms.
262
  
 
7.  Becoming Parties to the UNWC Would Improve 
Information-Sharing and Monitoring Procedures 
 
The obligation to monitor and exchange information in 
Article 9 of the UNWC comports with the similar obligations 
Amu Darya states have already undertaken under the following 
instruments: (1) the UNCCD, (2) the UNCCC, (3) the UNCBD, 
and (4) ASBP-3.
263
 
Under the UNCCD, states have an obligation to cooperate 
in the joint management, and conservation of land and water 
resources.
264
 The UNCCD is implemented primarily through 
action programs both on a regional and national level.
265
 The 
Subregional Action Programme for Central Asia under the 
UNCCD explicitly identifies the Aral Sea Basin as a problem 
area and identifies cooperation with the IFAS and ICWC as a 
key to ecological management.
266
 It also explicitly references the 
Nukus Declaration.
267
 The UNCCD has a Committee on Science 
and Technology (CST) that assists parties with their obligation to 
exchange information and cooperate.
268
 Currently, the Amu 
Darya states have an information database called the Regional 
                                                 
262 Id. 
263 See generally infra notes 264, 272-274 (describing obligations under 
the UNCCD, UNCCC, UNCBD, ASBP-3). 
264 Loures et al., supra note 132, at 20. 
265 Id.; U.N. Convention to Combat Desertification, Fact Sheet 1 An 
Introduction to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 1, 
http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/Publications/factsheets-
eng.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2012).    
266 UNCCD/SRAP, supra note 198, at 2. 
267 Id. at 2, 4. 
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Information System on Water and Land Resources in the Aral 
Sea Basin (CAREWIB).
269
 Becoming a party to the UNWC 
would apply the reporting obligations, which the Amu Darya 
riparians have under the UNCCD to international watercourses 
under Articles 8 and 9 of the UNWC.
270
 The Amu Darya states 
could integrate the CAREWIB database with the UNCCD’s CST 
to meet their obligations under the UNCCD and the UNWC.
271
 
The UNWC would assist the Amu Darya states in meeting 
their obligations under Articles 4, 5, and 7 of UNCCC by 
encouraging cooperation among riparians and by ensuring that 
development projects do not injure the Amu Darya ecosystem or 
communities dependent on it.
272
  
The UNWC would help the Amu Darya riparians meet their 
obligations to sustainably manage ecosystems under the UNCBD 
through the UNWC’s provisions on notification and consultation 
regarding planned measures, preventing and mitigating 
transboundary pollution, cooperation and information 
exchange.
273
  
The Amu Darya States included programs to meet their 
duties under MEAs in the ASBP-3.
274
 A main component of 
ASBP-3 is environmental protection.
275
 For example, ASBP-3 
section 2.1.2 deals with sustainable wetlands management, 
desertification reduction, and biodiversity restoration.
276
 
Programs in cluster 2.2 all relate to the management of 
biodiversity.
277
 Obligations under the UNWC would complement 
those of the MEAs and would assist the Amu Darya riparians in 
                                                 
269 Dinara Zigashina, International Water Law in Central Asia: 
Commitments, Compliance and Beyond, 20 J. WATER L. 96, 103-04 (2006), 
available at http://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/portal/files/95307/Ziganshina 
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sharing environmental information in order to determine 
“equitable utilization” of water resources.278 
 
C.  Objections to Ratification 
The Amu Darya riparians might object to becoming a party 
to the UNWC for several reasons: (1) fears that the UNWC 
would favor competing states, (2) worries about the general 
obligation to cooperate as well as prior notification about 
planned measures, (3) concerns about how the UNWC will affect 
the existing legal framework, (4) worries about the potentially 
mandatory fact finding, and (5) concerns about the potential loss 
of sovereignty over waters in their territory.  
The downstream states of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
might fear that “equitable utilization” favors the upstream 
riparians’ ability to develop hydroelectric resources, 
undermining Uzbekistan’s stranglehold over Tajik and Kyrgyz 
winter electricity supplies.
279
 However, both Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan are parties to the UNECE Convention, which also 
establishes an obligation to sustainably use transboundary 
watercourse resources.
280
 
On the other hand, the upstream states of Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan might worry that the “no-harm” 
rule prevents them from developing their hydropower potential 
while forcing them to provide free water to Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan.
281
 However, under the UNWC, the upstream 
riparians would be entitled to exploit the Amu Darya’s 
hydroelectric potential so long as their projects did not cause 
harm to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
282
 If a dispute arose 
regarding whether harm had occurred, the flexible dispute 
                                                 
278 Loures et al., supra note 132, at 18-21. 
279 See Salman, supra note 152, at 8-10. 
280 Status of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
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resolution mechanisms of UNWC Article 33 would resolve it to 
the satisfaction of the parties.
283
   
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan might hesitate to 
become parties to the UNWC because they might fear that the 
obligation of prior notification, especially for planned projects, 
would be overly onerous.
284
 However, the UNWC simply 
codifies the principle of customary international environmental 
law of “prior and timely notification” contained in Principle 19 
of the Rio Declaration for “activities that may have a significant 
adverse transboundary environmental effect.”285 Thus, the 
upstream riparians already have a duty of prior notification under 
the regional declarations and under binding MEAs and so 
becoming a party to the UNWC would not entail any new 
obligations on their part.
286
 
Any potential concern about the UNWC altering existing 
agreements in some undesired way is also unfounded because 
the UNWC does not alter any conflicting legal framework 
without the consent of the parties.
287
  
Furthermore, any worries that the Amu Darya riparians 
might have about the UNWC's dispute resolution process are 
also unfounded.
288
 Under the UNWC, the parties would be free 
to choose their desired settlement mechanism and the only 
mandatory type of dispute resolution, fact finding, must be 
administered impartially and in good faith so as not to favor one 
disputant over another.
289
 
Finally, the upstream Amu Darya riparians might worry 
about giving up sovereignty over waters that flow in their 
territory.
290
 However, any purported sovereignty certain riparians 
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might claim to enjoy would only be illusory because the theory 
that any state “owns” shared waters has been discredited.291 
While the Amu Darya states would enjoy limited territorial 
sovereignty over the waters in the Amu Darya Basin, their use of 
the waters would be governed by the UNWC's substantive 
obligations to manage the Basin in a sustainable way using an 
ecosystem approach, according to the principles of international 
transboundary watercourse law.
292
 Limited territorial sovereignty 
would mean just that for the Amu Darya Riparians—the ability 
for each individual riparian to do what it wishes with the waters 
in the Basin—within the limits of the UNWC.293 
 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the recent discovery of abundant natural resources in 
Central Asia, various world powers have been racing to develop 
regional transportation, energy and water links in the region.
294
 
The potential source of strife most likely to upset this balance is 
a dispute over the fresh water of the Amu Darya Basin. Thus, 
sustainable management of international water resources in the 
Amu Darya Basin, which contains the majority of the region’s 
fresh water, is of paramount importance. Since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the waters of the Amu Darya have been a 
source of conflict between the upstream and downstream states 
seeking to exploit the Amu Darya’s bounty for competing 
uses.
295
 The Soviet Union also left behind a management 
framework unsuitable for the modern reality. To remedy the 
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situation, the Amu Darya states have been actively soliciting aid 
from the United Nations as well as other international 
organizations in developing a suitable international watercourse 
management scheme.
296
 Becoming parties to the UNWC would 
provide the Amu Darya riparians with many benefits, such as 
modernizing the Basin’s current legal scheme. As a framework 
agreement, the UNWC is not suitable as a final agreement, but 
would complement any future, regional agreement such as the 
UNECE Convention or other regional agreement drafted by the 
Amu Darya states. However, if the status quo is maintained, 
laments like that of the Uzbek farmer Qubay Ortiqov will 
become all too common: “‘[w]e planted wheat, but the harvest 
was not good, and it was because of insufficient water.’”297  
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